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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the speech activity."s If courts would recognize that the monopoli-
zation of public discussion through saturation of the "market-
place" can predetermine how the voter will cast his ballot, they
might acknowledge that such monopolization can jeopardize the
political process just as surely as does an elected official's "debt" to
his financial supporters that predetermines the outcome of the offi-
cial acts and decisions.8 7
In the progression of first amendment decisions, Let's Help
Florida rests solidly on the precedent of Buckley and Bellotti.
Without a showing that the voice of large moneyed interests has
"drown[ed] out other points of view, '" the first amendment will
continue to protect the indirect influence of large campaign contri-
butions on voter decisionmakers. The fear that a political commit-
tee with a large amount of contributed funds will "buy up" the
mass market of ideas, and thus buy the vote on a mass level
through issue saturation, still seems too attenuated, and the value
of first amendment freedom is too precious, for one to expect the
court to validate state-imposed restrictions on contributions in the
referendum context.
LONNIE LIPTON COLAN
Clash Between Due Process and the Right
to Trial by Jury in Complex Litigation
In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.'
36. The Supreme Court decision in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
100 S. Ct. 2326 (1980), adds a new dimension to the threat posed by corporate expenditures
in furtherance of political causes to the ideal conception of a free marketplace of ideas. See
note 24 supra. Although the decision did not involve the electoral process, it demonstrates
that the Court apparently extends first amendment protection for the political messages of
monopolies as far as it does for the speech of any individual wishing to express political
views to an audience.
37. See generally Lee, California, in REFERNDUMS, supra note 32. In discussing refer-
endum campaigns and campaign expenditures, the author conceded that the success or fail-
ure of an initiative does not necessarily correspond to the amount of money expended, but
noted that disparities in funds can be decisive in a closely contested campaign. In particular,
a lengthy and complicated issue on which technical experts disagree, such as the safety of
nuclear power, puts a heavy burden on campaign publicity to educate the voter. Id. at 101-
07.
38. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1980).
1. 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980) (In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation).
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently
became the first circuit to rule explicitly that due process can pre-
clude the right to trial by jury in certain large, extraordinarily
complex civil cases. The issue arose after a domestic manufacturer
of television receivers, National Union Electric Company (Na-
tional), sued several Japanese television manufacturers in Decem-
ber 1970, seeking treble damages and injunctive relief for alleged
violations of antitrust and international trade laws." In 1974,
Zenith Radio Corporation (Zenith) brought a second lawsuit
against the same defendants and certain domestic manufacturers.3
Zenith repeated the allegations of National and also charged the
defendants with price discrimination. The defendants counter-
claimed, charging Zenith with price-fixing and maintaining sham
litigation.4
After the district court consolidated the two cases for trial,'
the plaintiffs made timely demands for a jury trial, which fourteen
of the defendants then moved to strike. Although the defendants
conceded that a right to jury trial normally exists in suits for treble
damages under the antitrust and antidumping laws, they con-
tended that proof of the claims would be too burdensome and com-
plicated for a jury.' The defendants claimed, for example, that to
make a proper evaluation of the allegations that the defendants
sold articles in the United States at a price substantially lower
than the price of such articles in Japan, the jurors would have to
understand currency fluctuations and diverse marketing tech-
niques, and to review thousands of technically distinct models of
products.7 Resolution of the conspiracy issues would require an un-
derstanding of business practices and marketing conditions in Ja-
pan and would involve review of thousands of separate transac-
tions.' Compounding the complexity of the case were certain
2. National alleged that the defendants sought to drive American television producers
out of the American market by selling televisions at artificially depressed prices in violation
of the 1916 Antidumping Act, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1976). The plaintiffs also claimed that the
defendants participated in an international conspiracy in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976), and § 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. § 8
(1976).
3. Specifically, Zenith charged the defendants with violations of the Robinson-Patman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976), and it charged defendants Matsushita and Sanyo with viola-
tions of § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
4. 631 F.2d at 1071-73.
5. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 388 F. Supp. 565 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975).
6. 631 F.2d at 1073.
7. Id. at 1074.
8. Id.
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conceptually difficult issues requiring proof of predatory intent and
proof of relevant product and geographic markets.9 The district
court anticipated that the trial would last a full year and noted
that nine years of discovery had produced millions of documents
and over 100,000 pages of depositions.10
Nevertheless, the district court denied the defendants' motion,
concluding that the seventh amendment" does not recognize the
complexity of a lawsuit as a valid reason for denying a jury trial.1'
On interlocutory appeal, the Third Circuit vacated the district
court's order, holding that the seventh amendment does not guar-
antee the right to a jury trial when a case is so complex that a jury
cannot satisfy the due process requirement that it rationally re-
solve each issue with a reasonable understanding of the evidence
and the legal rules, 3 and remanded to the district court for a rul-
ing on the complexity of the case. 4 The Third Circuit concluded
that
the most reasonable accommodation between the requirements
of the fifth and seventh amendments [is] a denial of jury trial
when a jury will not be able to perform its task of rational deci-
sionmaking with a reasonable understanding of the evidence and
the relevant legal standards. In lawsuits of this complexity, the
interests protected by this procedural rule of due process carry
greater weight than the interests served by the constitutional
guarantee of jury trial. Consequently, we shall not read the sev-
enth amendment to guarantee the right to jury trial in these
suits.16
Although other courts have stricken demands for trial by jury
in complex civil cases, 16 no court has ever set forth a constitutional
balancing test. Rather, courts have found within the seventh
amendment itself an exception to the right to trial by jury, for ex-
cessive complexity. In interpreting the limits on the seventh
9. Id. at 1075.
10. Id. at 1073.
11. The seventh amendment provides: "In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved ..
U.S. CONsT. amend. VII.
12. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 942 (E.D. Pa.
1979).
13. 631 F.2d at 1069, 1086.
14. Id. at 1090.
15. Id. at 1086.
16. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re
Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976). See also ILC Peripherals
Leasing Corp. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
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amendment's preservation of the right to a jury trial on all legal
issues in a case, 17 courts have relied on the factors set forth in a
footnote to the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Ross v.
Bernhard:18 "[T]he 'legal' nature of an issue is determined by con-
sidering, first, the pre-merger custom with reference to such ques-
tions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the practical abilities
and limitations of juries."1'
The first two prongs of the Ross test reflect the traditional his-
torical method of determining whether a suit is one at common law
or one in equity within the meaning of the seventh amendment. If
a case is of a kind that was triable to a jury when the states
adopted the seventh amendment in 1791, or if the relief sought is
traditionally associated with courts of law, then the case falls
within the court's legal jurisdiction, for which the seventh amend-
ment preserves the right to trial by jury.20 The third prong of the
Ross test has also provided a standard for distinguishing legal and
equitable issues. If, because of its "practical abilities and limita-
tions," a jury cannot capably perform its function of finding the
facts and reaching a verdict by rational means, then there is argua-
bly no adequate remedy at law, and equitable relief is appropri-
ate.2 1 In In re United States Financial Securities Litigation," for
example, the district court found that the complexity of the ac-
17. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472-73 (1962).
18. 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
19. Id.
20. 631 F.2d at 1078-79.
21. See Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Litigation, 92 HAtv. L. Rav. 898,
900-04 (1979). The author claimed that Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500
(1959), heralded the beginning of a more dynamic interpretation of the seventh amendment.
Although inadequacy of the legal remedy remains the standard for distinguishing legal and
equitable claims, the court must classify a lawsuit as legal or equitable not only with refer-
ence to the adequacy of legal remedies in 1791, "but in light of the remedies now made
available by the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Federal Rules." 359 U.S. at 506-07. See
also Comment, The Right to Strike the Jury Trial Demand in Complex Litigation, 34 U.
MiAMi L. REv. 243, 271-78 (1980).
In Matsushita, the district court suggested that the third prong of the Ross test might
refer to two limited circumstances in which the United States Supreme Court considered
functional aspects of jury trials ia the context of the seventh amendment. The first situation
was "the traditional availability of equity jurisdiction in complex accounting cases." 478 F.
Supp. at 929; see Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477-78 (1962). The second situa-
tion involved "actions committed by Congress to special adjudicatory bodies as part of a
statutory scheme." Id. at 929-30; see Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1976); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
22. 75 F.R.D. 702, 711 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
100 S. Ct. 1866 (1980); see Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 68 (1978) (the
court's traditional equity power is the source of the third prong of the Ross t~st). See also
Note, supra note 21.
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counting and commercial issues in the case rendered the jury inca-
pable of providing an adequate remedy for the litigants, and that
the case therefore fell within the court's equitable jurisdiction. The
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order striking the jury
demand, however, and refused to find a complexity exception to
the seventh amendment.'0
At least one court has attached constitutional significance to
the "practical abilities and limitations of juries." In In re Boise
Cascade Securities Litigation," the district court noted that "an
impartial and capable factfinder" is "central to the fairness which
must attend the resolution of a civil action," and that "at some
point,. . . the complexity of a case may exceed the ability of a jury
to decide the facts in an informed and capable manner. ' '12 Claim-
ing that the Supreme Court directly recognized these considera-
tions in Ross, the Boise Cascade court concluded that the third
prong of the Ross footnote is of "constitutional dimensions . . .
and must be seen as a limitation to or interpretation of the Sev-
enth Amendment."'
In Matsushita, the defendants sought to strike the plaintiffs'
demand for a jury trial on the basis of the arguments advanced in
United States Financial and Boise Cascade. The Third Circuit,
concluded that the complexity of a case can preclude a jury trial on
legal issues, but relied solely on a due process analysis.'7 The court
rejected the defendants' historical analysis and argument that ex-
traordinary complexity renders. a suit equitable in nature; 8 and al-
23. 609 F.2d at 431. The court also questioned whether a good test to separate complex
from noncomplex cases could ever be developed. Id.
24. 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
25. Id. at 104.
26. Id. at 105.
27. 631 F.2d at 1084-86.
28. The court first found that although there was not a statutory right to jury trial
under the Clayton and Sherman Acts, id. at 1075-78, the case involved rights and remedies
traditionally associated with courts of law. Id. at 1079. The court then addressed the argu-
ment that the complexity of the issues brought the case within the court's equitable
jurisdiction.
First, emphasizing the exclusively legal nature of the relief sought, the court rejected
the proposition that complex antitrust and antidumping suits are analogous to equitable
accounting actions, 631 F.2d at 1080-81. Secondly, the court found that the defendants did
not adequately support their claim that complexity alone was ever an established basis of
equitable jurisdiction in non-accounting cases. Id. at 1081-83. Finally, the court rejected the
argument developed in historical research commissioned by IBM, see Devlin, Jury Trial of
Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L.
REv. 43 (1980), that "the chancellor controlled the boundary between law and equity" so
that "[i]f, in 1791, a suit was too complex for a jury, the chancellor would have exercised his
control over his jurisdiction to decide the case in chancery." 631 F.2d at 1083. Commenta-
[Vol. 35:164
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though the complexity of the case seemed to fall within the limits
on the right to jury trial contemplated by the United States Su-
preme Court in the third prong of the Ross footnote, the court
found it "unlikely that the Supreme Court would have announced
an important new application of the seventh amendment in so cur-
sory a fashion."' Instead, the Third Circuit found constitutional
support for the authority to strike a jury demand in actions at law
within the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
The court approached the issue by analyzing the jury's role in
the administration of justice in light of the values promoted by due
process requirements. The court found that "[tihe primary value
promoted by due process in factfinding procedures is 'to minimize
the risk of erroneous decisions.' ,s Noting that "the law presumes
that a jury will decide rationally," ' the court stated further that
"in the context of a completely adversary proceeding, like a civil
trial, due process requires that 'the decisionmaker's conclusion...
rest solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hear-
ing.' ,2 If a case is so complex that a jury cannot understand the
evidence and apply the relevant legal rules, these values and re-
quirements of due process are violated. Thus, in an action at law
tors disagree on whether there is historical support for striking jury trials in complex cases.
Compare Devlin, supra, with Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury
in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. Rcv. 829 (1980).
29. 631 F.2d at 1080. The district court noted that "[tihe expanded boundaries for the
right to jury trial established in Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen seem to have been re-
garded . . . as constitutionally required," 478 F. Supp. at 913 n.38, and that consequently,
"some commentators have viewed Beacon Theatres, Dairy Queen, and Ross v. Bernhard
• . . as representing an abandonment of the historical test in favor of a 'dynamic' or 'flexi-
ble' or 'rational' approach to the seventh amendment." Id. (citations omitted). Noting that
the historical test defines only the minimum scope of the right to jury trial, the district
court insisted that "the [Supreme] Court's more recent decisions have eliminated any doubt
about the continuing validity of the historical test." Id.
30. Id. at 1084 (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Com-
plex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979), and citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
31. 631 F.2d at 1084. The jury's function in a civil suit is to "find facts and reach a
verdict by rational means." Id. at 1079. The law "does not contemplate scientific precision
but does contemplate a resolution of each issue on the basis of a fair and reasonable applica-
tion of the relevant legal rules." Id. See Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fic-
tions? 21 U. CHi. L. Rav. 386 (1954). See also Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil
Juries and the Allocation of Judicial Power, 56 Tx. L. REv. 47 (1977). The jury also per-
forms several functions besides factfinding. See text accompanying notes 39-44 infra.
32. 631 F.2d at 1084 (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970)). The cases
cited by the court to define the values promoted by due process did not use the fifth amend-
ment to justify taking away another express constitutional right. Goldberg v. Kelly and Ma-
thews v. Eldridge considered whether certain administrative procedures comported with due
process requirements. Greenholtz examined the "quantum and quality [of process] due" in
parole hearings. 442 U.S. at 13.
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on complex issues, the requirements of the fifth and seventh
amendments come into direct conflict.83 In this situation, the court
concluded, it must balance the constitutionally protected interests
and "reach the most reasonable accomodation between the two.""
After examining and weighing the interests protected by the
fifth and seventh amendments, the Third Circuit found that "the
loss of the right to jury trial does not implicate the same funda-
mental concerns" as do due process objections." If a jury is not
capable of rational factfinding, there is a danger that its verdict
will be erratic and unpredictable, thereby threatening the fairness
of the trial and undermining the ability of the court to render ba-
sic justice.86 Noting that the prospect of a prolonged trial can limit
the pool of potential jurors, eliminating many with experience that
would enable them to understand a complex case, the court found
that both the complexity of the issues and evidence and the dis-
rupting effect of a long trial on the personal life of jurors can con-
strain a jury's ability to render a rational verdict.87 On the other
hand, the court accepted as reasonable the "general presumption
that a judge is capable of deciding an extraordinarily complex
case," and opined that "[a] long trial would not disrupt the profes-
sional and personal life of a judge .... "38
In assessing the values protected by the seventh amendment,
the Third Circuit stated that courts can "provide fair trials and
can grant relief in accordance with the principles of basic justice
without the aid of a jury"89 and noted that the Supreme Court has
refused to incorporate the seventh amendment into the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment.4 0 The court also rejected




37. 631 F.2d at 1086. The district court challenged the assumption that a jury may not
be a competent finder of fact in extraordinarily complex cases, asserting that the "collective
wisdom, judgment and common sense" of a jury is at least as astute and perceptive as that
of a judge. 478 F. Supp. at 889. Indeed, one can argue that "the presence of a jury actually
disciplines and improves the factfinding process by imposing on both the court and counsel
the obligation to streamline, clarify and teach." Id. at 935. The district court further re-
marked that "thoughtful organization of evidentiary presentation by counsel" together with
"proper and frequent judicial guidance" through, for example, periodic charges on the law,
would enable a jury "to understand and deal intelligently with all the facts and issues." Id.
at 936. Finally, the court stated that its power to direct a verdict or grant judgment notwith-
standing the verdict would operate as a check against irrational verdicts. Id. at 937-38.
38. 631 F.2d at 1086-87.
39. Id. at 1085.
40. Id.; see Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
[Vol. 35:164
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the argument that. other non-factfinding benefits that juries bring
to civil trials must increase the weight attached to the seventh
amendment interests. The plaintiffs had argued and the district
court had noted that there are two unique virtues of juries that go
to "the very nature or character of justice provided by our judicial
system.""' The first is "blackbox" decisionmaking, which permits a
jury to issue a verdict without explanation or justification. Unlike a
judge, who must explain his findings of fact and apply the law rig-
idly, a jury can perform a type of "jury equity" and disregard legal
rules contrary to community standards and values without setting
precedent. 42 Juries also perform a "line-drawing" function, "ac-
cord[ing] a greater measure of legitimacy to decisions that depend
upon determinations of degree rather than of absolutes."' The
Third Circuit concluded, however, that if a jury cannot determine
the normal application of law to the facts of a case and "cannot
understand the evidence or legal rules relevant to the issue of
where to draw the line," then it cannot perform these functions
and its decision will still be arbitrary and unprincipled."
Having thus assigned weights to the constitutionally protected
interests of the seventh and fifth amendments, the Third Circuit
concluded that "due process precludes trial by jury when a jury
[cannot rationally resolve disputed issues] with a reasonable un-
derstanding of the evidence and legal rules.' 45 The court then re-
manded the case to the district court for consideration of the com-
plexity of this particular lawsuit.46 The Third Circuit attempted to
articulate an objective standard to guide the district court in deter-
mining at what point a case becomes so complex that a jury trial
violates a litigant's due process rights. Thus, the court of appeals
enumerated several factors that contribute to a jury's inability to
understand the evidence and legal rules. The court suggested that
the district court consider: (1) the overall size of the litigation, as
exemplified by the estimated length of trial, the quantity of evi-
dence, and the number of separate issues; (2) the conceptual diffi-
culties of the legal issues and the factual predicates to those issues;
and (3) the difficulty of segregating distinct aspects of the case.'7
.41. 478 F. Supp. at 938.
42. 631 F.2d at 1085; 478 F. Supp. at 938-40.
43. 631 F.2d at 1085; see 478 F. Supp. at 941-52.
44. 631 F.2d at 1085.
45. Id. at 1084.
46. 631 F.2d at 1089-90.
47. Id. at 1088-89.
198.0]
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Acknowledging the concern that authority to strike jury trial
demands on case-by-case findings of complexity might lead to a
long-run dilution of the seventh amendment, the Third Circuit em-
phasized that there is a strong presumption in favor of the right to
jury trial and that due process should allow denials of jury trials
only in the most exceptional circumstances.48 Moreover, the court
stressed the duty of the trial judge first to examine other available
methods and techniques, such as severance of multiple claims or
procedures as suggested in the Manual for Complex Litigation,49
for bringing the case within a jury's ability to decide.' 0 Further, to
ensure a good faith application of its suggested standard, the court
demanded that the trial court "make explicit findings on the di-
mension of complexity when it denies a jury trial in an action at
law on grounds of complexity."'51 Finally, the court noted that
mandamus would lie to remedy an erroneous denial of a jury
trial.2
The Third Circuit's decision in Matsushita reflects the wide-
spread concern that the extraordinary complexity of much modern
business litigation involves issues that are beyond the ability of ju-
ries to comprehend, resulting in irrational and unprincipled ver-
dicts. But, in its effort to accommodate the due process concern for
accurate factfinding by ensuring a rational and comprehending
factfinder,"' the court curtailed the express constitutional right to
a jury trial in certain cases at law. The fifth amendment should
temper the right to jury trial, not undermine it. By devising proce-
dures to enhance a jury's capabilities in complex cases, courts can
accommodate the requirements of due process without taking away
48. Id. at 1088.
49. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LTGATION (4th ed. 1977).
50. 631 F.2d at 1088. See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983 (D. Conn. 1978)
(usual procedures modified to enable jurors to remember facts and comprehend issues in
complex case). The dissent in Matsushita contended that the manifestations of complexity
in the case resulted from the liberal joinder rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
631 F.2d at 1091 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Noting that "[t]he seventh amendment guaran-
tees a jury trial of any separate claim for relief which would have been tried to a jury at
common law," id. (emphasis added), the dissent concluded that the issue was not ripe for
review. The issue "would only be properly presented to this court if a single claim for relief
against a separate defendant would be too complex for jury consideration." Id. at 1092.
51. 631 F.2d at 1089.
52. Id.; see, e.g., Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472-73 (1962).
53. The dissent criticized the majority's perception of the judicial process, stating: "We
have no real assurance . . . of objective truth whether the trial is to the court or to a jury.
The judicial process can do no more than legitimize the imposition of sanctions by requiring




the right to jury trial. There are many innovative techniques al-
ready available to make jury trials of complex cases more manage-
able. For example, the use of special interrogatories, periodic in-
structions on the legal issues, permitting the jury to take notes
during trial, and making exhibits and trial transcripts available
during the jury's deliberations, can aid juries in understanding the
issues." If these techniques are insufficient to reduce the complex-
ity of certain lawsuits, perhaps the solution lies in congressional
action. One commentator, for example, suggests that Congress
amend the Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968'1 to per-
mit the use of special juries in certain complex cases." Alterna-
tively, if the courts prove to be an inadequate forum for enforcing
the antitrust and antidumping laws, Congress could entrust their
enforcement to an administrative agency with special competence
in the field.5 As long as statutory rights are enforceable in a civil
action in a district court, however, the court should uphold the
right to a jury trial under the seventh amendment "if the action
involves rights and remedies of the sort typically enforced in an
action at law."58
STEVEN W. DAVIS
54. See 478 F. Supp. at 936 n.82.
55. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1875 (1976).
56. Note, The Case for Special Juries in Complex Litigation, 89 YALE L.J. 1155 (1980).
The author asserts that special juries are a constitutional alternative to ordinary juries in
the trial of complex cases. Id. at 1160-72. The author also speculates that it may be difficult
to impanel an impartial special jury. Noting that American economic education receives
criticism for its free-market bias, the author suggests that anyone qualified for special jury
service in certain complex cases (for example, cases involving government regulation of the
economy) "may have acquired free-market presumptions that render fair and impartial de-
cisions impossible." Id. at 1173 n.115.
57. In Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), the United States Supreme Court noted
that NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), and Katchen v. Landy, 382
U.S. 323 (1966), "uphold congressional power to entrust enforcement of statutory rights to
an administrative process or specialized court of equity free from the strictures of the Sev-
enth Amendment." See also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 455 (1976) ("[w]hen Congress creates new statutory 'public rights,' it
may assign their adjudication to an administrative agency with which a jury trial would be
incompatible, without violating the Seventh Amendment's injunction that jury trial is to be
'preserved' in 'suits at common law' ").
58. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974), qdoted in 478 F. Supp. at 930.
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